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Abstract—Membership inference attacks are one of the sim-
plest forms of privacy leakage for machine learning models: given
a data point and model, determine whether the point was used to
train the model. Existing membership inference attacks exploit
models’ abnormal confidence when queried on their training
data. These attacks do not apply if the adversary only gets access
to models’ predicted labels, without a confidence measure.
In this paper, we introduce label-only membership inference
attacks. Instead of relying on confidence scores, our attacks
evaluate the robustness of a model’s predicted labels under
perturbations to obtain a fine-grained membership signal. These
perturbations include common data augmentations or adversarial
examples. We empirically show that our label-only membership
inference attacks perform on par with prior attacks that required
access to model confidences.
We further demonstrate that label-only attacks break multiple
defenses against membership inference attacks that (implicitly
or explicitly) rely on a phenomenon we call confidence masking.
These defenses modify a model’s confidence scores in order to
thwart attacks, but leave the model’s predicted labels unchanged.
Our label-only attacks demonstrate that confidence-masking is
not a viable defense strategy against membership inference.
Finally, we investigate worst-case label-only attacks, that infer
membership for a small number of outlier data points. We show
that label-only attacks also match confidence-based attacks in this
setting. We find that training models with differential privacy
and (strong) L2 regularization are the only known defense
strategies that successfully prevents all attacks. This remains
true even when the differential privacy budget is too high to
offer meaningful provable guarantees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning algorithms are often trained on sensitive
or private user information, such as medical records [1, 2],
textual conversations [3, 4], or financial information [5, 6].
These trained models can inadvertently leak information about
their training data [7, 8, 9]—thereby violating users’ privacy.
In perhaps the simplest form of information leakage, mem-
bership inference [7] attacks allow an adversary to determine
whether or not a data point was used in the training data.
Revealing just this information can cause harm, as it leaks
information pertaining specifically to members of the model’s
training data, rather than about the user population as a
whole. For example, suppose a model is trained to learn the
link between a cancer patient’s morphological data and their
reaction to some drug. An adversary in possession of a victim’s
morphological data and with query access to the trained model
cannot directly infer whether the victim has cancer. However,
inferring that the victim’s data was part of the model’s training
set reveals that the victim indeed has cancer.
Existing membership inference attacks exploit the higher
prediction confidence that models exhibit on their training
data [7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. This difference in prediction
confidence is largely attributed to overfitting [7, 11]. In these
attacks, the adversary queries the model on a target data
point to obtain the model’s confidence and infers the target’s
membership in the training set based on a decision rule.
A large body of work has been devoted to understanding
and mitigating membership inference leakage in ML models.
Existing defense strategies fall into two broad categories:
1) reducing overfitting [7, 12, 14]; and,
2) perturbing a model’s predictions so as to minimize the
success of known membership attacks [15, 16, 17].
Defenses in the first category either use regularization
techniques (e.g., dropout, weight decay or early-stopping)
developed by the ML community to reduce overfitting, or
simply increase the amount of training data [7, 12, 14]. In
contrast, the second category of adversary-aware defenses
explicitly aim to minimize the membership inference leakage
as computed by a particular attack [15, 16, 17]. Existing
defenses in this category alter a model’s outputs, either through
a modification of the training procedure (e.g, the addition of a
loss penalty) or of the inference procedure post-hoc to training
(e.g., to flatten returned confidence scores on members).
In this paper, we introduce label-only membership inference
attacks. Our threat model makes fewer assumptions compared
to prior attacks, in that the adversary can only obtain (hard)
labels when querying the trained model, without any prediction
confidences. This threat model is more realistic in practice—
as many machine learning models deployed in user-facing
products are unlikely to expose raw confidence scores.
In the label-only setting, a naive baseline strategy predicts
that a target point is a member of the training set when the
model’s prediction is correct. We show that even this simple
attack matches the best confidence-based attacks in some
settings. In order to design label-only attacks that perform
better than this baseline, we will necessarily have to make
multiple queries to the target model. We show how to ex-
tract fine-grained membership leakage by analyzing a model’s
robustness to perturbations of the target data, which reveals
signatures of the model’s decision boundary geometry. Our
adversary queries the model for predictions on augmentations
of data points (e.g., rotations and translations in the vision
domain) as well as adversarial examples.
In an extensive evaluation we show that our attacks
match the performance of confidence-based attacks (see Sec-
tion VI-A). We further show that our attacks naturally break
existing defenses that fall into category (2) discussed above.
These defenses either implicitly or explicitly rely on a strategy
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that we call confidence masking.1 This strategy consists of
masking the membership inference leakage signal contained
in the model’s confidence scores, thereby thwarting existing
attacks. However, the (hard) labels predicted by the model
remain largely unaffected, which explains why such defenses
have little to no effect against our label-only attacks. Put
differently, confidence masking does not address the inherent
privacy leakage that stems from the model being overfit on
the training data. This allows us to break two state-of-the-art
defenses: MemGuard [16] and adversarial regularization [15].
While these defenses can successfully reduce the accuracy of
existing (confidence-based) membership inference attacks to
within 2 percentage points of random chance, they have a
negligible effect on the success rate of our attacks.
Overall, our evaluation demonstrates that the use of confi-
dence values in membership inference attacks is unnecessary.
Existing attacks either do not outperform the naive baseline,
or when they do, their performance can be matched by attacks
that only rely on the model’s predicted label.
Finally, we argue that successful membership inference de-
fenses should not only protect the privacy of the average user,
but of the worst-case outlier user. We find that for some models
with low average-case membership leakage, the membership
of users in the tails of the distribution can still be inferred with
high precision—even with label-only attacks. Models trained
with differential-privacy guarantees [19, 20, 21, 22] appear to
effectively minimize the amount of membership leakage for
all users, even when the formal privacy bounds are close to
meaningless (i.e., differential privacy for  ≥ 100).
We make the following contributions:
1) We introduce the first label-only attacks, leveraging data
augmentations and adversarial examples.
2) We show that confidence masking is not a viable
defense to privacy leakage, by breaking two canoni-
cal defenses that use it—MemGuard and Adversarial
Regularization—with our attacks.
3) We evaluate two additional techniques to reducing over-
fitting and find that training with data augmentations
can worsen membership inference leakage while transfer
learning can mitigate this leakage.
4) We introduce “outlier membership inference”: a stronger
property that defenses should satisfy; at present, differ-
entially private training and (strong) L2 regularization
appear to be the only effective defenses.
5) We will release code to reproduce all our experiments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Machine Learning
We consider supervised classification tasks [23, 24], wherein
a model is trained to predict some class label y, given input
data x. Commonly, x may be an image or a sentence and y
would be the corresponding label, for instance, a digit 0-9, an
object type, or a text sentiment.
1Similar to gradient masking from the adversarial examples literature [18].
We focus our study on neural networks [25]: functions
composed as a series of linear-transformation layers, each fol-
lowed by a non-linear activation. The overall layer structure is
called the model’s architecture and the learnable parameters of
the linear transformations are the weights. For a classification
problem with K-classes, the last layer of a neural network out-
puts a vector v of K values (often called logits). The softmax
function is typically used to convert the logits into normalized
confidence scores:2 softmax(v)i := evi/
∑K
i=1 e
vi ∈ [0, 1]. For
a model h, we define the model’s output h(x) as the vector of
softmax values. The model’s predicted label is the class with
highest confidence, i.e., argmaxi h(x)i.
1) Data Augmentations: Augmenting data aims to improve
the generalization of a classifier [27, 28, 29]. Data augmen-
tations are commonly used on state-of-the-art-models [27, 30,
31] to create new and larger datasets to learn from, without
the need to acquire more labeled data samples (in a costly
process). Augmentations are especially important in low-data
regimes [32, 33, 34]. Augmentations are domain-specific: they
apply to a certain type of input, (e.g., images or text).
We focus on image classifiers, where the main types of aug-
mentations are affine transformations (rotations, reflections,
scaling, and shifts), contrast adjustments, cutout [35], and blur-
ring (adding noise). By synthesizing a new data sample as an
augmentation of an existing data sample, x′ = augment(x),
the model can learn a more semantically-meaningful set of
features. Data augmentations can potentially teach the machine
learning model to become invariant to the augmentation (e.g.,
rotationally or translationally invariant).
2) Transfer Learning: Transfer learning is a common tech-
nique used to improve generalization in low-data regimes [36].
By leveraging data from a source task, it is possible to transfer
knowledge to a target task. A common approach for transfer
learning is to train a model on the data of the source task, and
then fine-tune this model on data from the output task. In the
case of neural networks, it is common to fine-tune either the
entire model, or just the last layer.
B. Membership Inference
Membership inference attacks [7] are a form of privacy
leakage that identifies if a given data sample was part of a
machine learning model’s training dataset.
Given an example x and access to a trained model h, the
adversary uses a classifier or decision rule fh to compute a
membership prediction f(x;h) ∈ {0, 1}, with the goal that
f(x;h) = 1 whenever x is a training point. The main chal-
lenge in mounting a membership inference attack is creating
the classifier f , under various assumptions about the adver-
sary’s knowledge of h and of its training data distribution.
Prior work assumes that an adversary has only black-box
access to the trained model h, via a query interface that on
input x returns part or all of the confidence vector h(x).
2While it is common to refer to the output of a softmax as a “probability
vector” because its components are in the range [0, 1], we refrain from
using this terminology given that the scores output by a softmax cannot
be rigorously interpreted as probabilities [26].
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a) Shadow Models: The original membership inference
attack of Shokri et al. [7] create a membership classifier
f(x;h) by first training a number of local “shadow” models
(we will also refer to these as source models). Assuming
that the adversary has access to data from the same (or a
similar) distribution as h’s training data, the adversary first
locally trains a number of auxiliary classifiers hˆi on subsets
of the data. Since these shadow models are trained by the
adversary, their training set and by extension, the membership
of any data point in these training sets is known. The adversary
can thus construct a dataset of confidence vectors hˆi(x) with
an associated membership label m ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, the
adversary trains a classifier f to predict m given hˆi(x). To
apply the attack, the adversary queries the targeted model h
to obtain the confidence vector h(x), and then uses its trained
classifier f to predict the membership of x in h’s training data.
Salem et al. [14] later showed this attack strategy could
be successful even without access to data from the same
distribution as h, and only to data from a similar task (e.g.,
a different vision task). They also demonstrated that training
shadow models is unnecessary: applying a simple threshold
on the targeted model’s confidence scores suffices. That is, the
adversary predicts that x is in h’s training data if the prediction
confidence maxi h(x) is above a tuned threshold.
b) Towards Label-only Approaches: Yeom et al. [11]
propose a simple baseline attack: the adversary predicts a data
point x as being a member of the training set when h classifies
x correctly. The accuracy of this baseline attack directly
reflects the gap in the model’s train and test accuracy: if h
overfits on its training data and obtains much higher accuracy
on its training data, this baseline attack will achieve non-
trivial membership inference. We call this the gap attack. If
the adversary’s target points are equally likely to be members
or non-members of the training set (for more on this, see
Section V-A), this attack achieves an accuracy of
1/2 + (acctrain − acctest)/2 , (1)
where acctrain, acctest ∈ [0, 1] are the target model’s accuracy
on training data and held out data respectively.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only attack
proposed in prior work that makes use of only the model’s
predicted label, y = argmaxi h(x)i. Our goal is to investigate
how this simple baseline can be surpassed to achieve label-
only membership inference attacks that perform on par with
attacks that use access to the model’s confidence scores.
c) Indirect Membership Inference: The work of Long et
al. [37] investigates the possibility of membership inference
through indirect access, wherein the adversary can only query
h on inputs x′ that are related to x, but not x directly. The
label-only attacks we present in this paper similarly make use
of information gleaned from querying the model on data points
related to x (specifically, various perturbed versions of x).
The main difference is that we focus on label-only attacks,
whereas the work of Long et al. [37] assumes adversarial
access to the model’s confidence scores. Our attacks will also
Query Interface Attack Feature Knowledge Source
confidence vector h(x), y train, data, label [7]
confidence vector h(x) train, data [38]
confidence vector h(x) – [14]
confidence vector h(x) – [14]
confidence vector L (h (x) , y) – [11]
label-only argmaxh(x), y label [11]
label-only argmaxh(aug(x)), y train, data, label ours
label-only disth(x, y) train, data, label ours
TABLE I: Survey of membership inference threat models.
For attack features, L is the model’s loss function, aug(x)
is a data-augmentation of x (e.g., image translation), and
disth(x, y) is the distance from x to the decision boundary.
Train, data and label knowledge mean, respectively, that the
adversary (1) knows the model’s architecture and training algo-
rithm, (2) has access to samples from the training distribution,
and (3) knows the true label of the examples being queried.
be allowed to query h at the chosen point x, but again only
to obtain the model’s predicted label.
d) Defenses: Defenses against membership inference
broadly fall into two categories.
First, Shokri et al. [7] demonstrated that overfitting plays a
role in their attack’s success rate. Thus, standard regularization
techniques such as L2 weight normalization [7, 12, 15, 16],
dropout [16], or differential privacy have been proposed to
defend against membership inference. Heavy regularization
has been shown to limit overfitting and to effectively defend
against membership inference, but may result in a significant
degradation in the model’s accuracy. Moreover, Yeom et
al. [11] show that overfitting is sufficient, but not necessary,
for membership inference to be possible.
Second, a variety of techniques have been suggested for
reducing the information contained in a model’s confidence
scores. These include truncating confidence scores to a lower
precision [7], reducing the dimensionality of the confidence
score vector [7, 12] (e.g., only returning the top k scores),
or perturbing confidences via an adversary-aware “minimax”
approach [15, 16, 17]. These later defenses modify either the
model’s training or inference procedure so that the model
produces minimally perturbed confidence vectors that thwart
existing membership inference attacks. We refer to defenses
in this second category as “confidence-masking” defenses.
e) Outliers in Membership Inference: Most membership
inference research is focused on protecting the average-case
user’s privacy: the success of a membership inference attack is
evaluated over a large dataset. Long et al. [37] focus on under-
standing the vulnerability of outliers to membership inference.
They show that some outlier data points can be targeted and
have their membership inferred to high precision (< 100
outliers at up to 90% precision) [37, 38]. Recent work analyzes
membership inference from the defender’s perspective, that is
in a white-box setting with complete access to the model, to
understand how overfitting impacts membership leakage [39].
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III. THREAT MODEL
The goal of a membership inference attack is to determine
whether or not a candidate data point was used to train a given
model. In Table I, we summarize different sets of assumptions
made in prior work about the adversary’s knowledge and query
access to the model.
A. Adversarial Knowledge
The membership inference threat model originally intro-
duced by Shokri et al. [7], and used in many subsequent
works, assumes that the adversary has black-box access to
the model h (i.e., the adversary cannot inspect the model’s
learned parameters and can only interact with it via a query
interface that returns the model’s prediction and confidence).
Our work also assumes black-box model access, with the
extra restriction—which we discuss in more detail in Sec-
tion III-B—that the model only returns (hard) labels to queries.
We note that studying membership inference attacks with
white-box model access [39] has merits (e.g., for upper-
bounding the membership leakage), but our label-only re-
striction inherently presumes a setting where the adversary
has black-box model access only (as otherwise, the adversary
could just run h locally to obtain confidence scores).
Assuming a black-box query interface, there are a number
of other dimensions to the adversary’s assumed knowledge of
the trained model:
a) Task Knowledge: refers to global information about
the model’s prediction task and, therefore, of its prediction
API. Examples of task knowledge include the total number of
classes, the class-labels (dog, cat, etc.), and the input format
(32 × 32 RGB or grayscale images, etc.). Task knowledge is
always assumed to be known to the adversary, as it is necessary
for the classifier service to be useful to a user.
b) Training Knowledge: refers to any knowledge about
the model architecture (e.g., the type of neural network, its
number of layers, etc.) and how it was trained (the training
algorithm, size of the training dataset, or number of training
steps, etc). Some of this information could be publicly avail-
able, or inferable from a model extraction attack [40, 41].
c) Data Knowledge: constitutes any knowledge about the
data that was used to train the target model. Of course, full
knowledge of the training data renders membership inference
trivial. Partial knowledge may consist in having access to
(or the ability to generate) samples from the same data
distribution, or from a related distribution.
d) Label Knowledge: refers to knowledge of the true
label y for each point x for which they are predicting member-
ship. Whether knowledge of a data point implies knowledge
of its true label depends on the application scenario. Salem
et al. [14] show that attacks that rely on knowledge of query
labels can often be matched by attacks that do not.
B. Query Interface
Our paper studies a different query interface than most prior
membership inference work. The choice of query interface
ultimately depends on the application needs where the target
model is deployed. We define two types of query interfaces,
with different levels of response granularity:
a) Full confidence vectors: On a query x, the adversary
receives the full vector of confidence scores h(x) from the
classifier. In a multi-class scenario, each value in this vector
corresponds to an estimated confidence that this class is the
correct label. Prior work has shown that restricting access
to only part of the confidence vector has little effect on the
adversary’s success [7, 12, 14].
b) Label-only: In this setting, the adversary only obtains
the model’s predicted label y = argmaxi h(x)i, without any
confidence scores. This is the minimal piece of information
that any query-able machine learning model must provide,
and is thus the most restrictive query interface, from the
adversary’s perspective. Such a query interface is also highly
realistic, as the adversary may only get indirect access to a
deployed model in many settings. For example, the model may
be part of a larger system, which takes actions based on the
model’s predictions. Here, the adversary can only observe the
system’s actions but not the internal model’s confidence scores.
In this work, we focus exclusively on the above label-only
regime. Thus, in contrast to prior research [7, 12, 13, 14], our
attacks can be mounted against any machine learning service,
regardless of the granularity of the provided query interface.
C. Our Threat Model
As our main goal is to show that label-only attacks can
match the success of prior attacks, we consider a simple threat
model that matches that typically considered in prior work–
except that we notably assume a label-only query interface.
We assume that the adversary has: (1) full knowledge of
the task; (2) knowledge of the target model’s architecture and
training setup; (3) partial data knowledge, i.e., access to a
disjoint partition of data samples from the same distribution
as the target model’s training data; and (4) knowledge of the
targeted points’ labels, y.
We note that prior work has proposed various techniques
to build strong membership inference attacks under relaxed
adversarial-knowledge assumptions, specifically of reduced
data and model architecture knowledge [11, 14]. To simplify
our exposition and to center our analysis on comparing the
confidence-vector and label-only settings, we leave a fine-
grained analysis of label-only attacks under different levels
of adversarial knowledge to future work.
IV. ATTACK MODEL DESIGN
We propose new membership inference attacks that improve
on existing attacks in two ways:
1) Our attacks extract fine-grained information about the
classifier’s decision boundary by combining multiple
queries on strategically perturbed samples.
2) Our attacks are label-only, i.e., they do not rely on the
model returning confidence scores.
Therefore, our attacks pose a threat to any machine learning
service that can be queried, regardless of any additional output
information it might provide in addition to the predicted label.
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Moreover, we show that our label-only attacks can break
multiple state-of-the-art defenses, that implicitly or explicitly
rely on “confidence-masking” (see Section VII).
A. A Naive Baseline: The Gap Attack
Label-only attacks face a challenge of granularity in deter-
mining the membership of a data point. For any query x, our
attack model’s information is limited to only the predicted
class-label, argmaxi h(x)i. A simple baseline attack [11]—
that predicts any misclassified data point as a non-member
of the training set—is a useful benchmark to assess the extra
information that different attacks (whether label-only or with
access to confidence vectors) can extract. We call this baseline
the gap attack because its accuracy is directly related to
the gap between the model’s accuracy on training data and
held out data (see Equation (1)) To glean additional bits
of information on top of this baseline attack, any adversary
operating in the label-only regime must necessarily make
additional queries to the model.
B. Attack Intuition
At a high level, our strategy is to compute label-only
“proxies” for the model’s confidence in a particular prediction,
by strategically querying the model on various perturbed
versions of x. Specifically, we evaluate the target model’s ro-
bustness to different input perturbations—either synthetic (i.e.,
standard data augmentations) or adversarial (i.e., adversarial
examples [42])—and predict that data points that exhibit high
robustness are training data points.
The intuition for leveraging robustness to data augmenta-
tions stems from the fact that many models use data augmen-
tation at training time. Thus, if some data point x was used
to train the model then so were augmented versions of x. By
querying the model on these augmented versions of a target
point, we aim to obtain a more precise membership signal.
In some sense, this can be seen as exploiting the model’s
“effective” train-test gap on an augmented dataset.
Even for models that were not trained with data augmenta-
tions, studying a model’s robustness to perturbations can serve
as a proxy for model confidence, as we now evidence for the
special case of (binary) logistic regression models. Given a
learned weight vector w and bias b, a logistic regression model
outputs a confidence score for the positive class of the form:
h(x) := σ(w>x+ b) ,
where σ(t) = 11+e−t ∈ (0, 1) is the logistic function.
For such a linear model, there is a monotone relationship
between the model’s confidence at a point x, and the Eu-
clidean distance from x to the model’s decision boundary.
Specifically, the distance from x to the model’s boundary
is (w>x + b)/||w||2 = σ−1(h(x))/||w||2. Thus, for linear
models, obtaining a point’s distance to the boundary yields
the same information as the model’s confidence score. As it
turns out, computing the distance from a point to the boundary
is exactly the problem of finding the smallest adversarial
perturbation, which can be done using label-only access to
a classifier [43, 44]. Our thesis is that for deep, non-linear
models, the relationship between a model’s confidence scores
and the distance to its boundary will persist.3 This thesis
is supported by prior work that suggests that deep neural
networks can be closely approximated by linear functions in
the vicinity of the data [46, 47].
C. Data Augmentations
Our data augmentation attacks proceed as follows. Given
a target data point (x, ytrue), we first create additional data
points {xˆ1, . . . , xˆN} via different data augmentation strategies,
described in more detail below. We then query the target model
h at all these points (including the original point) to obtain
labels (y0, y1, . . . , yN )← (h(x), h(xˆ1), . . . h(xˆN )). Let bi ←
I (ytrue = (yi)) be the indicator function for whether the i-th
queried point was misclassified. Finally, we apply a prediction
model f(b0, b1, . . . , bN )→ {0, 1} to decide whether x should
be classified as a training set member or not.
To tune the membership classifier f , the adversary first
locally trains a source (or “shadow”) model hˆ, assuming
knowledge of the target model’s architecture and of the
distribution of its training data. As the adversary knows the
training data for hˆ, it can train f to maximize membership
inference accuracy for this local model. The adversary then
“transfers” f to predict membership of target points using the
query responses of the black-box model h.
We experiment with two common data augmentations in the
computer vision domain: image rotations and translations.
a) Rotations: Our rotation augmentation rotates images
to within ±15◦ of the original image. Specifically, given a
rotation magnitude r ∈ [1, 15], we generate N = 3 images,
including the source, by rotating the source image by ±r◦.
b) Translations: Our translation attack follows a similar
procedure. Given a pixel bound d, we translate the image by
±i pixels horizontally, and by ±j vertically for i, j satisfying
|i|+ |j| = d. Note that this corresponds to N = 4d+1 trans-
lated images in total (plus the original untranslated image).
In Section VI-B, we explore the effect of picking different
query budgets (i.e., the values r and d for rotation and
translation augmentations) on the attack strength.
D. Decision Boundary Distance
The attacks described in this section aim to predict mem-
bership based on a point’s distance to the model’s decision
boundary. As we have seen above, for linear models the
distance to the boundary captures the same information as
the model’s confidence score. The attacks below extend this
intuition to deeper neural networks.
Given some estimate disth(x, y) of a point’s distance to the
model’s boundary, we predict that x is a training set member if
3Song et al. [45] also make use of adversarial examples to infer membership.
Their approach crucially differs from ours in two aspects: (1) they assume
access to confidence scores, and (2) they target models that were explicitly
trained to be robust to adversarial examples. In this sense, their approach
bares some similarities with our attacks on models trained with data
augmentation (see Section VIII, where we also find that a model’s invariance
to some perturbations can leak additional membership signal.
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disth(x, y) > τ for some threshold τ . We define disth(x, y) =
0 for misclassified points, where argmaxh(x) 6= y. To tune
the threshold τ , we train a local source model hˆ, and set τ so
as to maximize membership inference accuracy on hˆ.
a) A White-Box Baseline: Our first procedure for esti-
mating dist(x, y) is an idealized attack that assumes white-
box access to the model, and is therefore not label-only. To
estimate a point’s distance to the boundary, we use adversarial-
examples generated by the Carlini and Wagner attack [48]:
given (x, y) the attack tries to find the closest point x′ to x in
the Euclidean norm, such that argmaxh(x′) 6= y.
b) Label-Only Attacks: To make the attack label-only,
we rely on label-only attacks developed in the adversarial
examples literature [43, 44]. Given a point, (x, y), these attacks
begin by picking a random point x′ such that h(x′) 6= y, and
then issue multiple label-only queries to h to find the model’s
decision boundary. They then “walk” along the model’s bound-
ary while minimizing the distance to x. In our experiments,
we use the recent “HopSkipJump” attack [44], which has been
shown to closely approximate the distance estimates produced
by stronger white-box attacks (e.g., Carlini-Wagner), given a
few thousand label-only queries.
c) Robustness to Random Noise: As label-only adver-
sarial examples attacks such as HopSkipJump require a large
number of queries, we also explore a much simpler approach
based on random perturbations. Again, our intuition stems
from linear models: a point’s distance to the boundary is
directly related to the model’s accuracy when the point is per-
turbed by isotropic Gaussian noise [49]. The attack we propose
presumes that this relationship also holds for deeper models.
We compute a crude proxy for d(x, y) by evaluating the
accuracy of h on N points of the form xˆi = x+N (0, σ2 · I).
We tune the standard deviation σ, as well as the membership
threshold τ , on the adversary’s local source model hˆ.
V. EVALUATION SETUP
Our evaluation is aimed at understanding how label-only
membership inference attacks compare with prior attacks that
rely on access to a richer query interface. To this end, we aim
to answer the following questions:
1) Can label-only membership inference attacks match (or
even outperform) prior attacks that make use of the
model’s (full) confidence vector?
2) Under what settings do different label-only attacks per-
form best?
3) Are there settings in which label-only attacks can im-
prove upon prior attacks?
4) What defenses are successful against all attacks, whether
label-only or with access to full confidence vectors?
A. On Measuring Success
To evaluate an attack’s success, we pick a balanced set of
points from a task distribution, of which half come from the
target model’s training set. The adversary predicts whether
each point was in the training set or not. We measure attack
success as overall membership prediction accuracy but find F1
scores to approximately match, with near 100% recall.4
Overall, we stress that the main goal of our evaluation, and
of our paper, is to show that in settings where membership
inference attacks have been shown to succeed, a label-only
query interface is sufficient. In general, we should not expect
our label-only attacks to exceed the performance of prior
membership inference attacks since the former uses strictly
less information from queries than the latter. As we will see
in Section VII and VIII, two notable exceptions to this are
defenses that use “confidence masking” and models trained
with significant data augmentations. In both cases, we find that
existing attacks severely underestimate membership leakage.
B. Attack Setup
We evaluate our label-only membership inference attacks on
a variety of models trained on standard computer vision tasks,
i.e., CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [51], and MNIST [52]. Our focus
on vision datasets is mainly due to the important role of data
augmentations in the common computer vision pipeline, and
to compare directly with prior works that evaluated on similar
datasets. We note that the principles behind our attacks carry
over to other domains as well.
For each task, we train target neural networks on subsets
of the original training data. Controlling the size of the target
model’s training set lets us control the amount of overfitting,
which strongly influences the strength of membership infer-
ence attacks [11]. Prior works have shown that (confidence-
based) membership inference attacks mainly succeed in set-
tings where models exhibit a high degree of overfitting, so we
evaluate our label-only attacks in similar settings. We use two
representative model architectures, a standard convolutional
neural network (CNN) and a ResNet [30]. Our CNN has
four convolution layers with ReLU activations. The first two
3×3 convolutions have 32 filters and the second two have 64
filters, with a max-pool in between the two. To compute logits
we feed the output through a fully-connected layer with 512
neurons. This model has 1.2 million parameters. Our ResNet-
28 is a standard Wide ResNet-28 taken directly from [28] with
1.4 million parameters. All models are trained for 20 to 1000
training epochs, with early stopping when the training loss
fails to decrease by 0.005 from one epoch to the next.
To tune the attack, the adversary trains a source (or shadow)
model using an independent, non-overlapping subset of the
tasks’ original training dataset. For the attacks from prior work
based on confidence vectors, and our new label-only attacks
4Some recent works have questioned the use of (balanced) accuracy as a
measure of attack success and proposed other measures more suited for
imbalanced priors: where any data point targeted by the adversary is a-priori
unlikely to be a training point [50]. As our main goal is to study the effect of
the model’s query interface on the ability to perform membership inference,
we focus here on the same balanced setting considered in most prior work.
We also note that the assumption that the adversary has a (near-) balanced
prior need not be unrealistic in practice: For example, the adversary might
have query access to models from two different medical studies (trained on
patients with two different conditions) and might know a-priori that some
targeted user participated in one of these studies, without knowing which.
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based on data augmentations, we use shallow neural networks
as membership predictor models f . Specifically, for augmen-
tations, we use two layers of 10 neurons and LeakyReLU
activations [53]. The confidence-vector attack models use a
single hidden layer of 64 neurons, as originally proposed by
Shokri et al. [7]. We train a separate prediction model for each
class. We observe minimal changes in attack performance by
changing the architecture, or by replacing the predictor model
f by a simple thresholding rule. For simplicity, our decision
boundary distance attacks use a single global thresholding rule.
To account for randomness in our setup (e.g., sub-sampling
of the data, model training, etc.), we repeat each individual
experiment at least 3 times and report the mean and standard
deviation when appropriate.
VI. EVALUATION OF LABEL-ONLY ATTACKS
A. Label-Only Attacks Match Confidence-Vector Attacks
We first focus on question 1), understanding how well our
label-only attacks compare with the canonical confidence-
vector attacks of Shokri et al. [7]. Recall from Section IV-A
that any label-only attack (with knowledge of a target’s true
label) is always trivially lower-bounded by the baseline gap
attack of Yeom et al. [11], that simply predicts that a point is
a non-member of the training set if it is misclassified.
Our main result is that our label-only attacks consistently
outperform the baseline gap attack, and perform on-par with
prior confidence-vector attacks.
Figure 1 plots the accuracy of membership inference attacks
on CIFAR-10, for models trained on up to 10,000 data
points. The confidence-vector attack consistently outperforms
the baseline gap attack, demonstrating that it exploits non-
trivial membership leakage from the model’s query responses.
Remarkably, we find that our label-only boundary distance
attack—based on the HopSkipJump attack [44] for finding
adversarial examples—performs on-par with, or slightly better
than, the confidence-vector attacks, despite having access to a
more restricted query interface. Moreover, the simpler (and
more query efficient, see Section VI-B below) label-only
data augmentation attacks also consistently outperform the
baseline, but fall short of the full confidence-vector attacks.
The models in this evaluation did not use data augmentations
during training, in Section VIII we find that when they do,
our data augmentation attacks outperform all others.
Finally, we verify that as the training set size increases,
the performance of the baseline attack, as well as of all
the other attacks, monotonically decreases since the model’s
generalization gap is reduced.
Table II (a) reports similar results for the CIFAR-100 dataset
and (c) for the MNIST dataset. Due to the larger size of
CIFAR-100, we provide results for a single model trained on
a subset of 30,000 data points, which is the largest dataset
size we can experiment with since we keep half of the
60, 000 total dataset for training the adversary’s local source
model. Mirroring the results on CIFAR-10, we find that the
confidence-vector attack outperforms the gap attack, but that
its performance can be matched by our best label-only attacks.
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Fig. 1: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on
CIFAR-10. We compare the baseline gap attack, the
confidence-vector attack that relies on a fine-grained query in-
terface, and our label-only attacks based on data augmentation
and distance to the decision boundary. For the data augmenta-
tion attack, we report the best accuracy across multiple values
of r (rotation angle) and d (number of translated pixels).
B. The Query Complexity of Label-Only Attacks
We now answer question 2) of our evaluation: in what
regimes do different label-only attacks perform best?
Figure 1 shows that the decision-boundary distance attack
performs significantly better than our label-only attacks based
on data augmentations. Yet, the decision-boundary attack also
requires a large number of queries to the target model—in the
order of 10,000—while the data augmentation attacks only
make a small number of queries (between 3 and 22). We now
investigate how the success rate of different label-only attacks
is influenced by the attack’s query budget.
Recall that our rotation and translation attacks are
parametrized by r and d, respectively, which control the num-
ber of augmented images (queries) that our attacks evaluate
(namely N = 3 for rotations, and N = 4d+1 for translations).
Figure 2 (a)-(b) shows how the attack success rate is influenced
by these parameters. For both the rotation and translation
attack, we find that there is a specific range of perturbation
magnitudes for which the attack exceeds the baseline (i.e.,
1 ≤ r ≤ 8 for rotations, and 1 ≤ d ≤ 2 for translations).
When the augmentations are too small or too large, the attack
performs poorly because the augmentations have a similar
effect on both train and test samples (i.e., small augmentations
rarely change model predictions, whereas large augmentations
often cause misclassifications, for train and test samples alike).
For both attacks, an optimal parameter choice outperforms the
baseline by 3-4 percentage-points. Note that an adversary can
tune the best values of r and d using its local source model. As
we will see in Section VIII, these attacks perform significantly
better for models that used data augmentation at training time.
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(a) Rotation attack
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(b) Translation attack
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(c) Boundary distance attack
Fig. 2: Comparison of different label-only membership inference attacks on CIFAR-10. The target model is trained on
a subset of 2,500 data points. In (a) and (b), we compare the performance of the label-only data augmentation attack against
two baselines (the naive gap attack, and the confidence-vector attack), as we increase the size of pixel shifts d. In (c), we
compare attacks that threshold on an estimate of a point’s distance to the boundary. The white-box attack is an idealized
baseline that uses Carlini and Wagner’s attack [48]. The label-only attack uses HipSkipJump [44] with various query budgets,
and the random noise attack queries the model on a varied number of randomly perturbed samples.
In Figure 2 (c), we compare different attacks that approx-
imate the model’s robustness to small perturbations (in the
L2-norm)—to obtain a proxy for prediction confidence. As an
idealized baseline, we use the adversarial examples attack of
Carlini and Wagner [48] which assumes white-box access to
the target model. Though not label-only, its success rate serves
as a reasonable upper-bound for the amount of membership
leakage that can be extracted from the boundary distances.
We compare this upper bound to a label-only attack using
HopSkipJump [44]. This attack has two parameters governing
its query complexity: the number of iterations and the number
of search steps per iteration. By varying these parameters,
we explore the tradeoff between query complexity and attack
accuracy. As we can see, the attack matches the upper-bound
given by Carlini-Wagner with about 2,000 queries. In this
setting, it also matches the best confidence-vector attack (see
Figure 1). Even in low query regimes (< 100), the attack
outperforms the trivial gap attack by 4%.
The final attack we evaluate is a label-only attack that mea-
sures the model’s accuracy under random perturbations. Here,
our queries to the target model are of the form x+N (0, σ2 ·I).
The noise magnitude σ is tuned to maximize the attack success
rate on the adversary’s local source model. Surprisingly this
simple attack performs very well in low query regimes. For a
query budget < 300, it outperforms the HopSkipJump-based
attack and typically outperforms the data augmentation attacks
at a given query budget as well. For large query budgets, the
HopSkipJump attack produces more precise distance estimates
and outperforms the random attack.
VII. BREAKING CONFIDENCE-MASKING DEFENSES
In this section, we answer question 3) and showcase an
example where our label-only attacks outperform prior attacks
by a significant margin, despite the strictly more restricted
query interface that they assume. We evaluate a number of
defenses against membership inference attacks and show that
while these attacks do protect against existing confidence-
vector attacks, they have little to no effect on our label-only
attacks.
We identify a common pattern to these defenses that we
call confidence masking. Confidence masking defenses aim
to prevent membership inference by directly minimizing the
information leakage in a model’s confidence scores. Towards
this goal, a defense that relies on confidence masking explicitly
or implicitly masks (or, obfuscates) the information contained
in the confidence scores returned by the model, so as to thwart
existing attacks. We focus our analysis on two defenses in this
category: MemGuard [16] and adversarial regularization [15].
However, previously proposed defenses such as reducing the
precision or number of returned values of the confidence-
vector [7, 12, 14] and recent defenses such as prediction
purification [17] also rely on this mechanism.
Confidence masking thwarts existing attacks (e.g, by adding
noise to the vector) whilst having a minimal effect on the
model’s predicted labels. MemGuard [16] and prediction pu-
rification [17] explicitly maintain the invariant that the model’s
predicted labels are not affected by the defense, i.e.,
∀ x, argmaxh(x) = argmaxhdefense(x) ,
where hdefense is the defended version of the model h. In
adversarial regularization [15], instead of explicitly enforcing
this constraint at test time, the model is trained to achieve high
accuracy whilst simultaneously minimizing the information
available in the confidence scores.
There is an immediate issue with design of these confidence-
masking defenses: by construction they will prevent neither
the gap attack nor our stronger label-only attacks. Yet, these
defenses were reported to drive the success rates of existing
membership inference attacks to close to chance. This result
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suggests that prior attacks fail to properly extract membership
leakage information contained in the model’s predicted labels,
and indeed, implicitly contained within its scores. At the same
time, our results with label-only attacks clearly indicate that
confidence masking is not a viable defense strategy against
membership inference.
In the following sections, we show that both Mem-
Guard [16] (CCS’19) and adversarial regularization [15]
(CCS’18) fail to prevent the naive gap attack as well as our
more elaborate label-only attacks. In both cases, we show that
the defense does not significantly reduce membership leakage,
compared to an undefended model.
A. Breaking MemGuard
We implement the MemGuard algorithm for defend-
ing against membership inference. This defense solves a
constrained optimization problem to compute a defended
confidence-vector hdefense(x) = h(x) + n, where n is an
adversarial noise vector that satisfies the following con-
straints: (1) the model still outputs a vector of “probabilities”,
i.e., hdefense(x) ∈ [0, 1]K and ‖hdefense(x)‖1 = 1; (2) the
model’s predictions are unchanged, i.e., argmaxhdefense(x) =
argmaxh(x); and (3) the noisy confidence vector “fools”
existing membership inference attacks. To enforce the third
constraint, the defender locally creates a membership attack
predictor f , and then optimizes the noise n to cause f to mis-
predict membership. We consider the strongest version of the
defense in [16], that is allowed to make arbitrary changes to
the confidence vector (i.e., ‖n‖1 ≤ 1) under the constraint that
the model’s predicted label is unchanged.
Note that the second constraint guarantees that the defended
model’s train-test gap remains unaltered, and the defense thus
has no effect on the baseline gap attack. Worse, by con-
struction, this defense cannot prevent any label-only attacks
because it preserves the output label of the model on all inputs.
The main reason that this defense was found to protect
against confidence-vector attacks in [16] is due to those
attacks not being properly adapted to the defense. Specifically,
MemGuard is evaluated against confidence-vector attacks that
are tuned on source models without MemGuard enabled.
As a result, these attacks’ membership predictors are tuned
to distinguish members from non-members based on high
confidence scores, which MemGuard obfuscates. In a sense, a
label-only attack like ours is the “right” adaptive attack against
MemGuard: since the model’s confidence scores are no longer
reliable, the adversary’s best strategy is to extract membership
information from hard labels, which the defense explicitly does
not modify. Moving forward, we recommend that the trivial
gap baseline serve as an indicator of this form of confidence
masking: a non-adaptive confidence-vector attack should not
perform significantly worse than the trivial gap baseline in
order for a defense to protect against membership leakage.
From Figure 3, we observe that MemGuard, as expected,
offers no protection against our label-only attacks. All our
attacks significantly outperform the canonical (non-adaptive)
confidence-vector attack, as well as the baseline attack, across
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Fig. 3: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on
CIFAR-10 models protected with MemGuard [16]. The fact
that (non-adaptive) confidence-vector attacks perform much
worse even that the trivial train-test gap baseline illustrates that
these attacks are inappropriate for assessing the robustness of
membership inference defenses. The high success of label-only
attacks shows that MemGuard performs “confidence masking”
and does not address the model’s actual membership leakage.
all subset sizes that we evaluate. Thus, for a defense to protect
against all forms of membership inference attacks, it cannot
solely post-process the confidence-vector—doing so will still
leave the model vulnerable to label-only attacks. In Table II (b)
and (d), we report similar results on CIFAR-100 and MNIST,
respectively: while the defense breaks prior confidence-based
attacks, it has no effect on the generalization gap, or on our
stronger label-only attacks.
Prediction purification [17] is a similar defense. It trains
a purifier model, G, that is applied to the output vector of
the target model. That is, on a query x, the adversary receives
G(h(x)). The purifier model G is trained so as to minimize the
information content in the confidence vector, whilst preserving
model accuracy. While the defense does not guarantee that the
model’s labels are preserved at all points, the defense is by
design incapable of preventing the baseline gap attack, and it is
likely that our stronger label-only attacks would similarly be
unaffected (intuitively, G(h(x)) is just another deterministic
classifier, so the membership leakage from a point’s distance
to the decision boundary should not be expected to change).
In a similar vein, many simple defenses proposed in prior
work can be broken by label-only attacks. These includes any
types of static defenses that reduce information in confidence
scores, such as returning only the top-k confidence scores,
rounding the confidences to a lower precision, or various ways
of noising the confidences [7].
B. Breaking Adversarial Regularization
Adversarial regularization [15] differs from MemGuard and
prediction purification, in that it does not simply obfuscate
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Fig. 4: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on
CIFAR-10 models protected with Adversarial Regulariza-
tion [15]. This defense strategy does not explicitly aim to
reduce the train-test gap and thus does not protect against
label-only attacks. However, we find that this defense can
prevent attacks from exploiting much leakage beyond the gap.
confidence vectors at test time. Rather, it jointly trains a
target model and an attacker model in a min-max fashion.
In alternating training steps, the attacker model is trained
to maximize membership inference from the target model’s
outputs, and the target model is trained to produce outputs
that are accurate yet fool the attacker.
We train a target model defended using adversarial regu-
larization. We use a confidence-vector membership classifier
as our defensive classifier. This defense’s training has two
additional hyper-parameters: k controls the ratio of max-
imization to minimization steps during training, and λ is
the regularization constant that balances the target model’s
two objectives, i.e., low training error and low membership
leakage. We test several values of k and find that setting k = 4
enabled the target model to converge to a defended state. For
the regularization term λ, we try different values and report
all results in Figure 4. As we can see, an optimal choice of λ
can reduce the confidence-vector attack’s success to within 10
percentage-points of random guessing. However, the attack is
outperformed by our label-only attacks. The defense has only
a moderate effect on the model’s train-test gap, and thus the
accuracy of the trivial baseline attack is not reduced. We find
that our more complex label-only attacks do not significantly
outperform this baseline for most choices of regularization
term λ, which is consistent with the effects we observe for
more common regularization techniques such as L2 weight
decay (see Section VIII). Thus, this defense is not entirely
ineffective—it does prevent attacks from exploiting much
more leakage than the trivial gap attack. And yet, evaluating
the defense solely on (non-adaptive) confidence-vector attacks
leads to an overestimate of the achieved privacy.
Attack Accuracy
Gap attack 83.5
Confidence-vector 88.1
Data augmentation 84.6
Boundary distance 88.0
(a) CIFAR-10 Undefended
Attack Accuracy
Gap attack 83.5
Confidence-vector 50.0
Data augmentation 84.6
Boundary distance 88.0
(b) CIFAR-10 MemGuard
Attack Accuracy
Gap attack 53.2
Confidence-vector 55.7
Data augmentation 53.9
Boundary distance 57.8
(c) MNIST Undefended
Attack Accuracy
Gap attack 53.2
Confidence-vector 50.0
Data augmentation 53.9
Boundary distance 57.8
(d) MNIST MemGuard
TABLE II: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on
CIFAR-100 and MNIST. The target models are trained using
30,000 data points for CIFAR-10 and 1, 000 for MNIST. Table
(a) reports results without any defense, and (b) reports results
with MemGuard [16], which prevents the confidence-vector
attacks via “confidence-masking”.
VIII. DEFENDING WITH BETTER GENERALIZATION
Following our findings that confidence-masking defenses
cannot robustly defend against membership inference attacks,
we now answer question 4). We investigate to what extent
we can defend against membership inference attacks via
standard regularization techniques—the aim of which is to
limit the model’s ability to overfit to the training set. This
form of regularization was introduced by the ML community
to encourage generalization. In this section, we study the
impact of the following common regularization techniques on
membership inference: data augmentation, transfer learning,
dropout, L1/L2 regularization, and differential privacy.
The case of data augmentation is of particular interest: on
the one hand, the regularization effect of data augmentation
is expected to reduce membership leakage. On the other,
some of our attacks directly exploit the model’s overfitting
on augmented data.
We explore three questions in this section:
A) How does training with data augmentation impact mem-
bership inference attacks, especially the ones that query
the model on augmented data?
B) How well do other traditional regularization techniques
from the machine learning literature help in reducing
membership leakage?
C) How do these defenses compare to differential privacy,
which can provide formal guarantees against any form
of membership leakage?
A. Training with Data Augmentation Exacerbates Membership
Leakage
Data augmentation is commonly used in machine learning
to prevent a model from overfitting, in particular in low data
regimes [29, 54, 55, 56, 57]. Data augmentation is used to
increase the diversity of a model’s finite training set, by
efficiently synthesizing new data via natural transformations of
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Fig. 5: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on
CIFAR-10 models trained with data augmentation. Target
models are trained on a subset of 2500 images. The parameter
d controls, as in our attack, the number of pixels by which
images are translated during training. Training without data
augmentation corresponds to d = 0. For models trained
with significant amounts of data augmentation, membership
inference attacks become stronger despite the model gen-
eralizing better. Moreover, label-only attacks based on data
augmentation either perform as well or better than other
membership inference attacks.
existing data points that preserve class semantics (e.g., small
rotations or translations of images).
Data augmentation presents an interesting case study for
our label-only membership inference attacks. As it reduces
the model’s overfitting, one would expect data augmentation
to reduce membership leakage. At the same time, a model
trained on augmented data will have been trained to strongly
recognize not only the original data point, but also a number
of augmented versions of it, which is precisely the signal that
our label-only attacks based on data augmentations exploit.
We train target models by incorporating data augmentations
similar to those described in Section IV-C. We focus here on
image translations, as these are most routinely used to train
computer vision models. In each training epoch, the model
is evaluated on all translations of an image, parametrized by
the amount of shifted pixels d. This simple pipeline differs
slightly from the standard data augmentation pipeline which
samples an augmentation at random for each training batch.
We opted for this approach to illustrate the maximum leakage
incurred when the adversary’s attack queries exactly matches
the samples seen during training. Later in this section, we will
evaluate a robust pipeline taken directly from FixMatch [28]
and show that our results from this simple pipeline transfer.
We plot the success of various membership inference attacks
on models trained with data augmentation in Figure 5. First,
we observe the effect of augmentations on overfitting: as the
model is trained on larger image translations (by up to ±5
pixels), the model’s train-test gap decreases. Specifically, the
model’s test accuracy grows from 49.7% without translations
to 58.7% with d = 5, corroborating the benefits of data
augmentation for improving generalization.
Yet, we find that as the model is trained on more data
augmentations: (1) the accuracies of the confidence-vector and
boundary distance attacks decrease; and (2) the success rate
of the data augmentation attack increases.
Regarding the decrease in accuracy of the confidence-vector
and decision boundary attacks, this should be expected given
the model’s improved generalization. The increase in perfor-
mance of the data augmentation attacks confirms our initial
intuition that the model now leaks additional membership
information via its invariance to the training-time augmenta-
tions. Note that the label-only attack on a model trained with
d = 5 pixel shifts exceeds the accuracy of the confidence-
vector attack on the original non-augmented model, despite the
model with d = 5 having a higher test accuracy. This result
illustrates that a model’s ability to generalize is not the only
variable affecting its membership leakage: models that overfit
less on the original training dataset may actually be more
vulnerable to membership inference because they implicitly
overfit more on a related training set.
In Figure 11 in the Appendix, we investigate how the attack
is impacted when the attacker’s choice of the parameter d does
not match the value used during training. Unsurprisingly, we
find that the attack is strongest when the attacker’s guess for d
is correct, and that it degrades by 1-2 percentage points as the
difference in magnitude between train and test augmentations
grows. We note that data augmentation values for a specific
domain and image resolution are often fixed, so adversarial
knowledge of the model’s data augmentation pipeline is not a
strong assumption.
Following our study of a simple data augmentation scheme,
we now aim to understand to what extent membership in-
ference attacks apply to a state-of-the-art neural network and
data processing pipeline. We use, without modification, the
pipeline from FixMatch [28], which trains a ResNet-28 to
96% accuracy on the CIFAR-10 dataset, comparable to the
state of the art. As with our other experiments, this model is
trained using a subset of CIFAR-10, which sometimes leads to
observably overfit models, as indicated by a higher gap attack
accuracy. We train models using four regularizations, either
all enabled (“With Augmentations”) or disabled (“Without
Augmentations”).
1) random image flips across the horizontal axis,
2) random image shifts by up to 4 pixels in each direction,
3) random image cutout [35],
4) weight decay of magnitude 0.0005.
Our augmentation attacks are tuned to mimic the training
pipeline, since this is the case where our attacks perform
best. We evaluate 1000 randomly generated augmentations for
this attack. These results are reported in Figure 6. Similar
to our simple pipeline, we find that the use of augmenta-
tions in training consistently improves generalization accuracy.
Interestingly, the gap attack accuracy also improves due to
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Fig. 6: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on CIFAR-10 models trained as in FixMatch [28]. Our data augmentation
attacks, which mimic the training augmentations, match or outperform the confidence-vector attacks when augmentations were
used in training. As in previous experiments, we find our label-only distance attack performs on par with the confidence-
vector attack. “With Augmentations” and “Without Augmentations” refer to using all regularizations, as in FixMatch, or none,
respectively.
a relatively larger increase in training accuracy. Similar to
our simple pipeline, the confidence-vector attack accuracy is
degraded when training with augmentations, but our augmen-
tation attack can now perform on par with (and, in some cases,
better than) the confidence-vector attack.
An interesting question stemming from our experiments,
which we leave for future work, is to understand how much
membership leakage can be exploited by querying the target
model on augmented data in a setting where the attacker
does receive full confidence vectors. As such an adversary
receives strictly more information that the label-only attacks
we consider here, we expect such an attack to do at least as
well as the best attack in Figure 5, and potentially even better
(although all our experiments in this paper do suggest that
full confidence vectors provide little additional membership
leakage compared to hard labels).
B. Other Techniques to Prevent Overfitting
As we have seen, data augmentation does not necessarily
prevent membership leakage, despite its positive regularization
effect. We now explore questions B)-C) and turn to other
standard machine learning techniques aimed at preventing
overfitting: dropout [58], weight decay (L1/L2 regularization),
transfer learning, and differentially private training [19].
Dropout and weight decay are straightforward to add to any
neural network. We provide more detail in Appendix A.
Transfer learning improves the generalization of models
trained on small datasets. A model is first trained on a larger
dataset from a related task, and this model is then fine-tuned to
the specific low-data task. To fine-tune the pre-trained model,
we remove its last layer (so that the model acts as a feature
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Fig. 7: Accuracy of membership inference attacks on
CIFAR-10 models trained with transfer learning. The
source model for transfer learning is trained on all of CIFAR-
100. Models are tuned on subsets of CIFAR-10.
extractor), and train a new linear classifier on top of these
features. We call this approach last layer fine-tuning. An
alternative is to fine-tune the feature extractor together with
the final linear layer, i.e., full fine-tuning.
We pre-train a model on CIFAR-100 to a test accuracy
of 51.6%. We then use either full fine-tuning or last-layer
fine tuning on a subset of CIFAR-10. The results of various
membership inference attacks are in Figure 7. We compare
the gap attack to the best label-only attack, noting that the
best label-only attack performed on par with the confidence-
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Fig. 8: Comparison of confidence-vector and label-only
attacks on models with varied defenses. Target models
are trained on 2500 data points from CIFAR-10. Point sizes
indicate relative regularization amounts within a defense.
vector attack in all cases. We observe that transfer learning
indeed reduces the generalization gap, especially when only
the last layer is tuned (this is intuitive as linear layers have
less capacity to overfit compared to neural networks). We
see that with full fine-tuning, the model still leaks additional
membership information, and thus is not an effective defense.
Tuning just the last layer however reduces all attacks to the
baseline gap attack, which performs only marginally better
than chance. However, we find that full fine-tuning can achieve
better test accuracies, as shown in Figure 9.
Finally, differentially private (DP) training [19] enforces—
in a formal sense—that the trained model does not strongly
depend on any individual training point. In other words, it
does not overfit. In this paper, we use DP-SGD [19], a differ-
entially private gradient descent algorithm (see Appendix A
for details). We find that to train differentially private models
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Fig. 9: Test accuracy and label-only attack accuracy for
models with varied defenses. Target models are trained on
2500 data points from CIFAR-10. Models towards the bottom
right are more private and more accurate. Point sizes indicate
relative regularization amounts within a defense.
to comparable test accuracy as undefended models, the formal
privacy guarantees become mostly meaningless (i.e.,  > 100).
We evaluate membership inference attacks against models
trained with a wide variety of different defensive techniques
in Figure 8. We find that most forms of regularization do
not reduce the train-test gap below 20 percentage points, and
fail to prevent even the baseline gap attack from reaching
60% accuracy or more. The only two forms of regularization
that consistently succeed in reducing membership leakage
are strong forms of L2 regularization (λ ≥ 1) and training
with differential privacy. In order to better understand the
tradeoff between privacy and utility, Figure 9 displays the
relationship between each model’s test accuracy and vulner-
ability to membership inference. As we can see, the models
trained with differential privacy and strong L2 regularization
prevent membership inference at a high cost in generalization
ability. Thus these high levels of regularization are actually
causing the model to underfit. The plot also clearly indicates
the privacy benefits of transfer learning: among models with
a similar level of privacy leakage, these models achieve
consistently better generalization, as they benefit from the
features learned from non-private data. Combining transfer
learning and differentially private training can further mitigate
privacy leakage at nearly no cost in generalization, yielding
models with the best tradeoff. When transfer learning is not
an option, dropout appears to perform better.
Figure 8 again illustrates the shortcomings of confidence-
masking defenses such as MemGuard and Adversarial Reg-
ularization: instead of reducing a model’s train-test gap, they
obfuscate model outputs so that existing attacks perform worse
than the trivial baseline attack. Our label-only attacks bypass
these obfuscation attempts and break the defenses.
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Fig. 10: Outlier membership inference attacks on defended
models. Target and source models are trained on a subset
of 2500 points from CIFAR-10. β = 2% outliers are iden-
tified with less than γ = 10 neighbors. We show precision-
improvement from the undefended model, using our best label-
only membership inference attack.
IX. WORST-CASE MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE
In line with prior work, our experiments show that the best
average-case membership inference attacks often extract more
leakage information that the trivial train-test gap baseline, but
only by a moderate amount. Moreover, whenever prior attacks
do succeed in extracting additional membership leakage, we
find that the same can be achieved by an adversary with label-
only query access to the model.
We thus now turn to the study of membership inference
in the worst-case, i.e., inferring membership only for a small
set of “outlier” users. Intuitively, even if a model generalizes
well on average over the data distribution, it might still have
overfit to unusual data points in the tails of the distribution [9].
The study of membership inference for outliers was initiated
by Long et al. [37]. We follow a similar process as theirs to
identify potential outlier data, as described below.
First, the adversary uses a local source model hˆ to map
each targeted data point to the model’s feature space. That is,
for each input x we extract the activations in the penultimate
layer of hˆ. We denote these extracted features as z(x). We
define two points x1, x2 as neighbors if their features are close,
i.e., d(z(x1), z(x2)) ≤ δ, where d(·, ·) is the standard cosine
distance and δ is a tunable parameter. We define an outlier as a
point with less than γ neighbors in the source model’s feature
space, where γ is another tunable parameter. Given a dataset
X of potential targets, and an intended fraction of outliers β
(e.g., 1% of the data), we tune δ and γ so that a β-fraction of
points x ∈ X are defined as outliers.
The adversary then only runs the membership inference
attack for the selected outliers. We define the adversary’s
success as its precision in inferring membership of outliers
in the targeted model’s training set.
We run our membership inference attacks on outliers for
the same models that we evaluated in Figure 8. The results
are in Figure 10. For different type of regularization schemes,
we display the improvement in the attacker’s precision when
targeting solely outliers, compared to targeting the entire
population. We find that we can always improve the attack
by focusing only on outliers, but that strong regularization
(e.g., as obtained by L2 weight decay with large λ, or with
differential privacy) prevents membership inference even for
outliers. As in the average case, we find that the best label-only
attacks perform on-par with prior confidence-vector attacks, so
we simply report on the best overall attack in Figure 10.
X. CONCLUSION
We have developed three new label-only membership infer-
ence attacks. Their label-only nature requires fundamentally
different attack strategies, that—in turn—cannot be trivially
prevented by obfuscating a model’s confidence scores. We
have used these attacks to break two state-of-the-art defenses
to membership inference attacks.
We have found that the problem with these defenses runs
deeper, in that they cannot meaningfully prevent a trivial attack
that predicts a point as a training member if it is classified cor-
rectly. As a result, any defenses against membership inference
necessarily have to help reduce a model’s train-test gap.
We have further confirmed that attacks from prior work can,
in some settings, extract more membership leakage than this
baseline attack, but that the same can be achieved by label-only
attacks that operate in a more restrictive adversarial model.
Finally, via a rigorous evaluation across many proposed de-
fenses to membership inference, we have shown that differen-
tial privacy provides the strongest defense against membership
inference, both in an average-case and worst-case sense, but
that this may come at a cost in the model’s prediction accuracy.
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APPENDIX
A. Description of Common Regularizers
Dropout [58] is a simple regularization technique, wherein
a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) of weights are randomly “dropped” (i.e.,
set to zero) in each training step. Intuitively, dropout samples
a new random neural network at each step, thereby preventing
groups of weights from overfitting. At test time, the model is
deterministic and uses all the learned weights. We experiment
with different dropout probabilities ρ.
L1 and L2 regularization simply add an additional term of
the form λ · ||w|| to the model’s training loss, where w is
a vector containing all of the model’s weights, the norm is
either L1 or L2, and λ > 0 is a hyper-parameter governing
the scale of the regularization relative to the learning objective.
Strong regularization (i.e., large λ) reduces the complexity
of the learned model (i.e., it forces the model to learn
smaller weights). We experiment with different regularization
constants λ.
Differential privacy guarantees that any output from a
(randomized) algorithm on some dataset D, would have also
been output with roughly the same probability (up to a
multiplicative e factor) if one point in D were arbitrarily
modified. For differential privacy, we use DP-SGD [19], a
private version of stochastic gradient descent that clips per-
example gradients to an L2 norm of τ , and adds Gaussian
noise N (0, c2τ2) to each batch’s gradient. We train target
models with fixed parameters c = 0.5 and τ = 2. We train
for a varied number of steps, to achieve provable differential
privacy guarantees for 10 ≤  ≤ 250.
B. Additional Figures
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Fig. 11: Attack accuracy of our translation attack for
various choices of d. Target models are trained on 2500
data points from CIFAR-10 with varied sizes of translation
augmentations. The attack’s accuracy is maximized when it is
instantiated with the same size d of translations as used for
training.
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